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MARITAL RAPE: 
THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 
DR. JOANNE CAT ANIA 
Introduction 
Concern over the marital rape exemption has definitely increased in state 
judiciaries - unfortunately this does not equally apply to the state legislatures. 
Rape within marriage has been legally endorsed for more than one hundred 
years in America and to date, in most of the states this behaviour is legally 
protected, making the marital rape exemption the rule rather than the 
exemption I despite the twentieth century's enlightened views of marriage and 
female equality. Statistics are alarming 2, but appalling as they might sound, 
they seem to fail to persuade some who refuse to believe there is such a crime 
as marital rape. :i 
Increased awareness about rape has come about as women have gained 
more equality and as women's groups have strived to bring the public's attention 
to the fact that rape is not caused by the woman herself, but is the result of 
violence committed upon her by a violent person. It is precisely because of 
this long-standing and erroneous belief that rape is a sexual rather than a violent 
crime that it has been extremely difficult for legislatures, juries and the courts 
to deal rationally with the subject. 
This papter will analyze: ( 1) the history of the marital rape exemption 
and the common law authority thereto, including a critique of the theories that 
have served to justify it, (ii) marital rape as a social_ crisis in America, (III) 
statutory and judiciary responses, (IV) constitutional considerations, and (V) 
possible statutory reforms. 
1. History of Marital Rape Exemption and the Common Law Authority
Thereto
The marital rape exemption owes its origin to English common law in
the seventeenth century with Lord Matthew Hale's declaration that, "the 
husband cannot be gulity of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, 
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract." + Despite the 
fact that the marital rape exemption was an assertion with no fundamental 
judicial authority for support, this became the authority for the spousal 
immunity in both England and the United States. 5
English cases subsequent to Hale's statement demonstrate that the marital 
rape exemption was not absolute in England even at the time. English common 
law presumed a wife impliedily consents to sexual intercourse with her husband; 
it also provided the wife with a revocable consent. Revocation of a wife's consent 
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was strictly limited and as a prerequisite required a mutual separation agreement 
or a court-ordered separation. Thus, ''under English common law, there never 
existed and absolute irrevocable marital (rape) exemption that would protect 
a husband from a charge of rape in all circumstances.'' 6
Early American cases did follow the English case law, but did not follow 
the exceptions which allowed a wife!s consent to be revoked. In 1857, a 
Massachusetts court stated in Commonwealth v. Frogerty, 7 apparently the 
first American court to consider the Hale doctrine, that marriage was a defense 
to the charge of rape. 8 In 1905, a Texas case, Frazier v. State, 9 carried 
Hale's principle further and stated, consent is that "which she gives when she 
assumes the marriage relation, and which the law will not permit her to retract 
in order to charge her husband with the offense of rape.'' 10 However, this 
blind and unwarranted subscription to Hale's doctrine seems to have come 
to a halt in State v. Smith, 11 where the court concluded that it was "a bare,
extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago, '' 12 and found no
authority to support it. n. 
In that case, Albert Smith, who was indicted for the rape of his wife sought 
to dismiss this count of the multicount indictment on the grounds that the 
common law excluded husbands from the charge of rape even if they had forcible 
sexual intercourse with their wives. 1 .. He further argued that New Jersey's
rape statute codified that common law spousal exception and that it could not 
be altered by the court. At trial court level, the rape count of the indictment 
was dismissed i;; on the grounds that the court had no authority to end the 
marital exemption which had become an implied part of the rape statute of 
New Jersey. 16 Such a prerogative, according to the court, belonged 
exclusively to the legislature. 
Following an amendment to the New Jersey rape statue in 1979, expressly 
providing that marriage to the victim was not a defense to the charge of rape, 
17 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court's dismissal and 
reinstated the rape count against the defendant. Hale's implied consent doctrine 
was dismissed in the following manner: 
"Without deciding whether an exemption existed in any situations at 
all, we think that it was not meant to exist during the entire legal 
duration of a marriage. Therefore, we decline to apply mechanically 
a rule whose existence is in some doubt and which may never have 
been intended to apply to the factual situation presented by this 
case. '' 1K 
Therefore, 
11 A man separted from his wife - and perhaps one not separated - could 
not invoke an outdated and doubtful rule to avoid prosecution for rape 
simply because he was still legally married to his victim.'' 9 
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Another landmark decision in this respect was Commonwealth v. Chretien, 
20 wherein the Court of Massachusetts declared that no common law marital 
rape exemption exists in that state's rape statutes and husbands thus can be 
prosecuted for rape of their wives. The court found that the legislature's 
enactment of domestic violence legislation in 1978 e,cpressed the legislature's 
intent ot criminalize marital rape. 
These two decisions have already proved invalubale as regards cases 
challenging the existence of a common law marital rape exemption, and now 
stand as the leading case law on the issue in the United States. They have made 
it clear that regardless of whether such an exemption existed at common law, 
there is no place in today's society, given today's laws, for such an anachronistic 
concept. 
New rationales were used to support Hale's principle after it was discovered 
that the principle lacked legal foundation - rationales which, although archaic 
in nature, unfortunately endured in American and English law for decades. 
Each of them will be examined in turn. 
A - Marriage Contract Implies Permanent Consent
This is by far the most commonly used justification. 21 Surprisingly, even in
the light of the movement for women's equality, a 1984 Virginia Supreme Court 
decision, 22 while invoking this theory, declared that a wife must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that she revoked her implied consent through a "manifest 
intent" to terminate the marital relationship. "23
Logically, even if one were to accept the implied consent theory, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the wife also consents to both violence and injurty. 
24 Granted, both the wife and husband agree to have intercourse as part of 
the marriage consummation, but their personal sexual autonomy is not 
completely extinguished. 25 A well-reasoned opinion of Justice Wachtler of the 
New York Court of Appelas in Liberta, 26 found the implied consent to be 
"untenable." 27 Moreover, the consent doctirne effectively gives a husband 
the opportunity to take the law into his own hands with violence and force 
in order to make his wife comply with her a
l
leged "implied consent" when 
he should peacefully seek a divorce or other similar relief in domestic courts. 28 
This theory appears more ludicrous in the light of the fact, that even if 
the wife could impliedly consent, the husband's remedy for a breach of contract 
would be in the form of damages, not a "forced (specific) performance." 29 
As the Smith court rightly pointed out, this theory puts married women in 
a worse position than single women because the latter can charge rape against 
men who force them into sexual intercourse even if they have consented to 
intercourse with those men on previous occasions. 30 Given monogamy as a 
societal goal, the court noted that the acceptance of the contract theory could 
result in the bondage of the wife. 31
When husband and wife are separated, the implied consent doctrine 
becomes irrelevant, because it is groundless to argue that the wife's implied 
consent still exists to have sexual intercourse with a man, her husband, with 
whom she no longer cohabits. Fortunately, many state statutes uphold a wife's 
revocation of consent when the couple has severed their union but the 
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requirements needed to establish revocation of consent and separation vary 
from state to state. 32. 
B - Wife as Property of Her Husband 
Indeed, before the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, a 
married woman was unable to perform acts of civil life; wives viewed as their 
husband's chattel, deprived of all civil identity. 33 This theory is however,
anachronistic in today's society especially in the light of the fact that women 
can own and control property separately from their husbands. Thus, it would 
logically follow that public policy which supports the marriage relationship must 
necessarily extend to the woman, s right to control her body. 34 
In Trammel v. United States, 35 The Supreme Court rejected the archaic
notion that the wife was a husband's chattel, 36 which goes to show that this 
theory is no longer accepted in American jurisprudence. Logically, it should 
also cease to be ajustifiaction for the marital rape exemption. However, because 
the view of the women as the chattel of men has been relegated to history in 
American case law and in as much in America's tort low, it follows that rape 
laws should also change from protecting a man's property interests to guarding 
a woman's safety and privacy interests. 37 
C - The Unities Treaty 
Blackstone articulated this doctirne in his Commentaries. 
"By marriage, the husband and wife are one pe·rson in law: that is, 
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated (into her 
husabnd.)" 38 
A husband cannot therefore be guilty of rape because he cannot be gulity 
of raping himself. This concept, fallacious on its face, has been abolished in
most States. 39 
D - "Separate Spheres" Ideology 
This theory gradually displaced the unities theory as the legal justification 
for sexual inequality. Under this vision of social relations, men inhabit the public 
realm of politics and the marketplace and women inhabit the private realm 
of the family. Women were no longer naturally inferior, but naturally different. 
This ideology helped shaped the notion that any legal intrusion upon the 
woman's sphere constituted an illegitimate public invasion of the private sphere. 
The private subordination of women was therefore accomplished by the absence 
of laws restraining male power. In this unregulated sphere, men were free to 
rape their wives. Although the nineteenth amendment, 40 Title VII of the Civil 
Rights act of 1964, H and the 1971 case Reed "'· Reed, 42 represent legal
signposts on the road to full disintegration of the separate spheres ideology, 
the ,·itality of the marital rape exemption testifies to the continuing influence 
of this ideology on the formation of legal doctrine. u 
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E - The Marital Rape Exemption Promotes Spousal Reconciliation
This is a more recent justification suggested for the marital rape exemption
and is based on the rationale that allowing a wife to bring criminal charges 
against her husband for rape would impede any possibility of reconciling the 
marriage. This argument is undeniably fallacious on its face becaus� it is the 
violence resulting from the rape, not the wife's attempt to find protection under 
the law, which unravels the marriage. 44 Moreover, this policy argument 
assumes that there remains a marriage to be reconciled and that the violence 
of rape is an injury from which a wife can recover and adjust. Yet even if a 
marriage could be reconciled and the perpetrator forgiven, it does not necessarily 
foJlow that a wife who.declines reconciliation should be prevented from charging
her husband with rape. 45 
It is true that the states have an interest in the physical protection of 
individuals as well as the family, but this state interest is not furthered by the 
marita1 rape exemption. 
F - The State Should not Interfere with Marital Relationships
The assertion that the state's interest in promoting family harmony comes
before that of protecting individuals is illogical. Although promoting harmony 
in marriage is a legitimate state interest, "there is no rational relation between 
allowing a husband to forcibly rape his wife and these interests.�' 46 As Justice 
Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 47 the family is
sacred, but it is not beyond regulation "and it would be an absurdity to suggest 
either that offenses may not be committed in the bosom of the family or that 
the home can be made a sanctuary of crime.'' 48
G - The Marital Rape Exemption Eliminates Fabricated Charges 
The fear here is that if a divorce is pending, the possibility for bringing 
a charge of rape against the husband would give women great power and wives 
would not forego the opportunity to retaliate. This proposition is 
overwhelmingly pregnant with misconceptions. 
(i) The possibility that married women will file charges is no greater
than the possibility that unmarried women will do so;
(ii) The American judicial system is capable of determining and
dismissing fabricated charges;
(iii) False charges can be asserted for any crime;
(iv) Rape trials are extremely embarassing for the victim and
therefore it is unlikely that the revengeful wife would use this
shameful, embarassing and self-incriminating channel for her
retaliation;
(v) Abuse of the opportunity to charge husbands with rape has not
occurred in jurisdictions that have abrogated the marital rape
exemption. In fact, Oregon district attorney Peter Sandrock
confirms that Oregon experienced no "flood" of marital rape
cases since dropping its marital rape exemption in 1977. 49 
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H - The Marital Rape Exemption Presents Insurmountable Problems of Proof 
Although this seems to be a more plausible justification at first sight, it 
is still no excuse for disallowing a ravaged wife her constitutional right to seek 
a remedy at law. When has difficulty to prosecute determined what a crime 
is? Treason, conspiracy, child abuse, and incest are difficult to prove, but there 
is no outcry to decriminalize them. 
I - Alternative Remedies Available 
Although remedies for other injuries to a woman's body are available, 
such as assault and battery, none of these remedies punishes for the oppressive 
violence of the crime of rape. Assault and battery are different from rape because 
the latter crime involves a special humiliation and special violation. 
The alternative remedies argument fails to recognise the fact that rape 
in marriage does not diminish the rights violated, and also that alternative 
remedies fail to protect the wife from further abuse. An appropriate deterent 
to this type of violent behaviour is not presently available. 
J - Marital Rape is a Less Heinous Crime
Another justification offered for the marital rape exemption is that when
performed by a spouse, rape is less serious than when performed by a stranger. 
This argument, however, seems to ignore the fact that, in most cases, a marital 
or acquaintance rape will be more traumatic for the victim than stranger rape. 
511 Moreover 
'
"When you are raped by a stranger you have to live with a frightening 
memory. When you are raped by your husband, you have to live with 
the rapist. '' 5:1 
Marriage certainly does not mitigate rape's trauma, because it is a crime 
of violence - this theory is supported by the severe penalties associated with 
rape when contrasted with the lesser penalites for assault and battery. Therefore, 
a rape within the confines of marriage is no less heinous than stranger rape 
merely because the victim and rapist are married. 
II. Marital Rape as a Social Crisis in America
These archaic and poorly reasoned rationales supporitng descriminilization
of marital rape seem anachronistic in the progressive atmosphere of the 
twentieth century. Despite the momentum that the women's movement has 
gained throughout the past two decades, especially as regards the raging battles 
for equal pay, equal opportunity, relief from sexual harassment and the right 
to abortion, the marital rape issue was surprisingly ignored and remained very 
much "the crime in the closet." :,:! As researcher Nicholas Groth points ou.t, 
marital rape 
"may be the most pred.ominant type of sexual offense 
committed ... because of pre_vailing attitudes and legal codes, it goes 
largely undetected. Like other family problems, it is kept within the 
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family and both mental health and criminal justice agencies have 
traditionally been cautious of 'interfering' in family matters.'' 53 
This ignorance was fostered, in large part, by the failure to report marital 
rape incidents to authorities and the affiicted wives' fear of reprisal. Only until 
recently, it was no small oversight to state that none of the states in the whole 
of the United States criminalized marital rape, and therefore women had no 
legal motivaiton to report it, especially if it would expose their marital problems 
or if they were unsure whether they could legally prove a rape had 
occurred. :H
Fortunately, the situation is not so precarious today since a few states have 
abolished the implied or explicit marital rape exemption from their statutes. 
Y, Indeed, the law in most states protects a man from prosecution for fhe rape 
of his wife (as will be examined in Part III.) The marital "right" to rape one's 
wife is expressed in state criminal statutes, which typically define rape as' 'forced 
sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.'' According 
to Black's Law Dictionary �6 however, the definition of rape is "unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a female without her consent.'' Moreover, several courts 
and scholars have determined rape to be sexual intercourse without consent. 
Underlying these misconceptions in the crime of marital rape is a failure 
or refusal to acknowledge that rape is not a crime of sex but a crime of violence. 
It is the violence, outrage and injury to the victim, not the sex which demands 
criminal punishment. It is the coercion by the forecful penetration and threats 
against another's will which is the essence of rape. 57 Indeed, modern writers
on the subject agree that the greatest harm of rape is the psychological injury, 
in addition to the physical injuries, resulting from the domination and denial 
of freedom .. 'IB Moreover, "marital rape is frequently quite violent and 
generally has more severe, traumatic effects on the victim than other rape." 
.>!> Stranger rape is a devastating, one-time occurrence, marital rape frequently 
involves a seires of devastating occurrences, often spanning years. One study 
found that fifty-two percent of the victims of marital rape suffer severe long­
term effects 611 as compared to thirty-nine percent of the victims of stranger
rape. '" 
A married woman certainly relinquishes some autonoJJ1y, but she most 
certainly does not exchange her autonomy for a license by her husband to 
commit violence upon her body. Violence and marriage are strange bedfellows, 
but several studies have revealed that most battered woman have also been 
sexually assaulted, often because the wife conceded to intercourse in order to 
avoid being beaten. ".! The idea is certainly revolting, but violence and 
marriage do collide behind closed doors in our society. 
Rape of a woman by her husband is not a bizarre, unusual or isolated 
act. Rather, marital rape is a problem of seirous magnitude and consequence, 
as we can inf er from the above consideration. Professor Richard Gelles, 
sociologist at Rhode Island University, who has done extensive research on 
battered women, has estimated that the number of women in the United States 
who are raped by their husbands, as part of a beating or a sequel to it, could 
be well over two million. 63 The understanding of rape as violence is 
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tantamounting to resolving the central issue of whether thee rime of marital 
rape should be penalized. 
III.Statutory and Judicial Responses
Marital rape law reform has proved to be slow and legislators remain indifferent. 
Unfortunately, even when legislatures have attempted some reform, most have 
failed to achieve total abolition of the marital rape exemption - which should 
be the ultimate goal for all states. It is difficult for women to lobby for this 
kind of legislation as Sherly Chase proves in disclosing details of the strategy 
and the cumbersome process that she and her dedicated entourage of women 
(and a few men) used to outlaw marital rape through the legislature, in the 
state of Connecticut. tH This problem comes mainly in tht women's attempt 
to relate to male legislators the physical and emotional horrors that have been 
committed by husbands. A form that was drawn up by a Montana legislator 
as a joke and circulated to other senators during a campaign for a marital rape 
law, demontrates why women might encoutner problems. 65 (See Appendix 1) 
To date, only ten states exP.ressly allow prosecution of husbands for marital 
rape under all cirumstances. 60 State rape stuatutes thwart prosecution for 
marital rape in various ways. Traditionally, rape has been defined as 
nonconsentual sexual intercourse by a man with a female, not his wife. Some 
states expl!citly incorporate a marital rape exemption by defining rape in this 
manner, h, while other states refer simply to intercourse with a female or 
68 person and then define that term to exclude the wife or spouse of the actor. 
In states with marital rape exemptions, the scope of the exemption depends 
upon the perceived stability of the underlying marriage. States generally regulate 
the scope of the exemption through the definition of'' not married'' under the 
statute. For example, some states define "not married" so as to allow 
�rosecution only if the parties were living apart at the time of the incident. 
•'' Other states allow prosecutio� only if the parties at the time of the incident 
were separated by court order, '0 or were living apart and one spouse had fil!!d 
a petition for annulment, divorce, separation, or separate maintenance. 11 
In Alabama, Illinois, and south Dakota, a husband is subject to prosecution 
for rape only if a final di\'orce decree existed at the time of the incident; a wife 
separated from her husband under agreement or court decree has no legal 
recourse. ·- Several states allow prosecution for husbands for charges of first 
or second-degree rape, but disallow prosecution for lesser sexual offenses. ,·i 
The California statute is interesting in that it does not simply eliminate the 
spousal exception from the definition of rape but sets out various conditions 
that must be met beofre either spouse can charge the other with rape. Penal 
Code Section 262, Subsection 2(b) requires that the victim report the crime 
withing 30 days. A person convicted of spousal rape need not register as a sex 
offender, as a person convicted of rape of a nonspouse must. The legislature 
also expressly refused to extend to spousal rape subsections that define rape 
as an act of intercourse in which a person is prevented from resisting because 
he or she is administered a narcotic, intoxication, or anesthetic substance by 
or with pri,·ity of the accused. Thus, if a spouse is legally unable to consent, 
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under the influence of a narcotic substance, that spouse in unable to revoke 
his or her 'consent', this clearly means that the contractual consent theory is 
alive and well in the California Penal Code. 74 
As the above legislative update indicates, there has certainly been some 
improvement as regards the outlawing of marital rape in several states - but 
more needs to be done in order to reach the ultimate goal, which is the 
criminalization of marital rape in all circumstances. At this point, it would 
be interesting to give an overview of the latest case-law on the subject, and 
in doing so to detect the courts' attitude in handling such cases. 
Most of the legal changes in this respect have occurred since 1979 when 
John Rideout of Salem, Oregon, was acquitted of raping his wife, Greta, in 
a trial that attracted nationwide attention. At that time, laws dating to the 
seventeenth century, when a woman was viewed as the legal property of her 
husband, were still in effect in nearly all 50 states. The Rideout trial marked 
the beginning of a trend toward equal treatment of marital and non-marital 
rape. 
The traditional elements of the crime of rape are three, but a fourth is 
often included in the marital rape exemption. They are: (1) carnal knowledge, 
penetration, or intercourse (2) force and (3) noncoilsent. The fourth element 
some courts included was that the victim could not be the wife of the perpetrator. 
75 For many years, the fact that prosecutrix and defendant were not married 
was very important, even if later this fact was only necessary as evidence to 
prove there was consent to the common law crime of rape. However, the courts 
were instrumental in eroding this common law marital rape exemption doctrine, 
and then bringing down the elements of rape to only three. In State v. Smith 
iii as has already been pointed out above, the Court levelled an unprecedented 
attack on the common law marital rape exemption, even after analyzing the 
history and doubtful validity and existence of the alleged common law 
exemption, it concluded that it was now no longer a part of the rape statute 
so as to exempt defendant-husband from prosecution and conviction for rape 
of the spouse. Although the Court expressed a strong disapproval of the common 
law exemption, it relegated its abolition to the state legislature. 77 Although 
the New Jersey court limited its decision to the facts of the Smith case, it left 
no doubt as to it its distaste for the common law exemption. 
In a similar case, Commonwealth v. James K. Chretien, 78 which 
involved the interpretation of a rape statute that did not contain an express 
spousal exemption, a husband was convicted of raping his wife while the two 
were living apart and a final divorce decree was pending. 79 The court held 
that the common law applied to husbands only when the marriage relationship 
had been severed by a divorce judgement nisi. Therefore, if the marriage had 
been severed a husband could be convicted for marital rape. 80 The court here 
spoke about an "intent" of the legislature's comprehensive revision of the rape 
laws in 1974, to criminalize marital rape and eliminate any spousal exemption. 
The decision went further than that of the New Jersey court, since it did not 
limit the opinion to only more rapes occurring after the entry of a preliminary 
divorce decree or occurring after the spouses had separated. By holding that 
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the 197 4 revisions eliminated the spousal exemption altogether, spouses in 
ongoing marriages, even while still living together, are subject to prosecutio.n 
under the 1974 revised Massachusetts rape statute. 
Unfortunately, both the New Jersey and Massachusetts courts refused to 
decide the threshold question of whether Hale's doctrine constituted part of 
the common law - both courts based their holdings on the assumption that the 
exemption was part of the common law. However, the importance of these 
two cases lies in that they constitute a break-away from the long unchallenged 
belief that a marital rape exemption exists under common law. 
A more recent move away from the common law's absolute marital 
exemption occurred in 1983, when a New York court struck down New York's 
statutory marital rape exemption because it violated equal protection rights 
guaranteed in both the state and federal constitutions. 81 Indeed, People v. 
DeStefano, was the first case in this country to examine the constitutionality 
of an express statutory marital rape exemption. It is a landmark case in that 
it lays the groundwork for future constitutional challenges to the marital rape 
exemption. 82 The court examined the traditional justifications for the marital 
rape exemption and concluded that none of them constituted a government 
interest sufficient to meet any of the three tests associated with equal protection 
analysis. The court held the "implied consent" theory invalid because of the 
recognized constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion and use birth 
control without her husband's approval. It concluded that the "logical extension 
of more rights is that a woman has the right to refuse the physical act that 
leads to pregnancy and that a woman's right "to individual autonomy and 
to control procreation are but part of the more comprehensive right to bodily 
integrity." a:J 
Another significant case in this respect is State v. Rider, 84 where the 
Florida Court of Appeals held that Florid's sexual battery statute, which contains 
no express spousal exemption, does not incorporate a common-law exemption. 
In the Rider case, the spouses were living together as husband and wife at the 
time of the rape. No divorce or serparation proceedings had been initialted, 
and no temporary restraining order or separation agreement existed. The first 
Florida case to address the marital rape exemption was Florida v. Smith, 85 
and there it was held that no common-law exemption exists in Florida, but 
it was unclear whether this would be applied only to separated spouses. The 
Court of Appeals in Re Rider adopted a broad interpretation of Re Smith and 
refused to distinguish between spouses living together and those living apart 
for purposes of eliminating the marital rape exemption. The Rider decision, 
like the 1981 Masachusctts case of Commonwealth v. Chretien, (above) 
expressly held that no common law marital exemption exists even in the case 
of cohabiting spouses. Thus, the Florida cases are extremely significant in states 
that have no express statutory exemption, for they suggest that when courts 
in those states adjudicate marital rape cases they are not confronted with a 
choice of applying or abolishing a legitimate common law doctrine, but with 
adopting an antiquated doctrine of dubious origins that is incompatible with 
20th century legal and societal concepts of marriage and women's 
autonomy. l\t, 
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Two recent Virginia Supreme Court cases have established a very limited 
exception to the common law concept of spousal rape immunity: Weishaupt 
v. Commonwealth, 87 and Kizer v. Commonwealth. 88 In the first case, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that a common law marital exemption does not
apply when there has been a 'defacto' end to the marriage. The cour:t refused
to decide whether a common law exemption should be abandoned altogether,
limiting its holding to the particular facts of the case. In Re Weishaupt, the
husband and wife had maintained separate residences and refrained from any
sexual contact. After approximately eleven months of continuous separtion,
the husband attempted to have sexual relations with his estranged wife. The
court rejected defendant's contention that the English common law contained
an absolute marital rape exemption which should apply in Virginia, on the
ground that the implied consent to sexual relations in a marriage could be
revoked. The court also held that in the light of recent cases in Virginia
establishing a woman's independent control over her property, she should have
the same protection and control over her physical person. 89 The court also
found that the Virginia no fault divorce statute "embodies a legislative
endorsement of a woman's unilateral right to withdraw an implied consent to
marital sex." 90 If the state failed to recognize the wife's ability to unilaterally
withdraw the implied consent to marital sex, then it would have to deny the
wife's statutory right to withdraw from the marriage contract .. 91 The court
also stressed three requirements for the recognition of unilateral revocation of
consent:
1) 
2) 
3) 
intent to terminate the marital relationship by living separate 
and apart from her husband 
refraining from voluntary sexual intercourse with her husband 
conducting herself in a manner that establishes a defacto end 
to the marriage. 9'l
Recently however, in Kizer v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme 
Court clarified Re Weishaupt so as to significantly limit the impact of that 
decision. In Re Kizer, the couple had not co.nsistently maintained separate 
residences, though they were living apart at the time of the alleged rape. The 
marital history was replete with trial separations and attempts to make the 
marriage work. After a lengthy separation period, the husband gained entrance 
to the apartment and had forcible sexual intercourse with his wife. The majority 
opinion noted that, under Re Weishaupt, the wife's revocation of con�ent must 
be demonstrated by her manifest intent to terminate the marital relationship. 
The court found evidence to show a violation of the rape statute, but insufficient 
evidence to satisfy the third element required to show the requisite intent. 
Although the couple had lived separate and apart and refrained from voluntary 
sexual intercourse, the commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the wife had, 
in light of all the circumstances, conducted herself in a manner that established 
a de facto (or actual) end to the marriage. The majority concluded that a wife's 
conduct must be such that the husband perceived, or reasonably should have 
perceived, that the marriage actually was ended in order to meet the third 
Weishaupt requirement. 9:J
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In Virginia, therefore, the additional proof of violence required to rebut 
the presumption of consent is replaced by the requirement that a wife manifest 
her intent to end the marriage. A married woman must not only provide 
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under the rape statute, but must also 
provide the requisite intent by satisfying the three factual requirements 
established in Re Weishaupt. The result of the Supreme Court's clarification 
of that third requirement, however, is to place a much more arduous burden 
on a victim of spousal rape than that borne by a victim of rape by a stranger 
or even a fiance. 9 ..
Georgia too has lately joined the growing list of states that recognize marital 
rape as crime. In Warren v. Georgia, 95 the court refused to read a marital 
rape exemption into the Georgia rape statue, concluding that the implied 
consent theory is ''without logical meaning and obviously conflicts with our 
constitutional and statutory laws and our regard for all citizens of this state.'' 
Women's rights organizations were particularly pleased by the New York 
court decision in People v. Liberta, 96 where the New York Court of Appeals 
held that New York's rape statue violated equal protection. 97 The decision 
declared that a married woman has the same right to control her own body 
as does an unmarried woman. The New York decision is unequivocal, whereas 
most other state�, even the more progressive ones, have retained some 
differences between marital and non-marital cases. For example, some states 
allow prosecution in marital cases only if the woman was subjected to actual 
physical abuse before being raped - not just the threat of physical harm. Other 
states consider marital rape as a second degree felony, while non-marital rape 
may be prosecuted as a first-degree folony. According to Judge Wachtler, the 
chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, ''there is no rational basis for 
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. To do so is to violate 
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. "98
The New York decision is also significant because it appears to be the 
first time that the highest court in any state invalidated an explicit statutory 
exemption for marital rape. "We recognize that a court should be reluctant 
to expand criminal statutes due to the danger of usuring the role of the 
legislature,'' Associate Judge Wachtler wrote for the court, ''but in this case, 
overriding policy concerns dictate our following such a course.'' 99
From that which has been discussed above, it may be fairly inferred that 
the courts have been more responsive than the state legislatures to the 
seriousness of the crime of marital rape. They have certainly served as catalysts 
for the gradual erosion of the common law marital rape exemption and the 
traditional policy justifiaction of the crime of marital rape. Laura X, director 
of the National Clearinghouse on Marital Rape in Berkely, California, said 
that winning a court case is a much easier process than lobbying a state 
legislature. 100 One hopes that other state courts follow suit to Re Liberta, and 
that gradually all state legislatures will endorse marital rape as a crime. 
IV. Constitutional Considerations
The constitutional problems inherent in nearly all rape statutes must also
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be examined and analyzed before the marital rape exemption could be justified. 
Part IV focuses on a rights-based argument as a means both for challenging 
the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption and for achieving gender 
equality. The constitutional right to equal protection of the law and the 
constitutional right to privacy agruably threaten the constitutionality of the 
marital rape exemption. 
The second part of Part IV agrues that although a rights-based approach, 
is a powerful one to take in court to render the exemption invalid, it may not 
be the wisest legal avenue by which to challenge the marital exemption, because 
it fails to identify marital rape as part of the broader problem of women's 
subordinaiton. w, The gender discrimination approachf might, however, very 
well serve this purpose, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Personnel Adminsitraotr v. Feeney. '°2
A (i) - The Marital Rape Exemption Violates Equal Protection 
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution guarantees 
that individuals who are similarly situated will be similarly treated. The equal 
protection clause does not prevent discrimination; it requires that a classification 
cannot be arbitrary, cannot unfairly restrict fundamental rights, and cannot 
be founded on discriminatory criteria. Therefore, statutory schemes which deny 
identical tratment for identical acts are ripe for equal protection challenges. 
103 A statute which treats males and females differently violates the equal 
protection clause unless the statute's classification scheme is substantially related 
to an important governmental interest. to.
Classifications based on marital status, those which treat married 
individuals differently from unmarried individuals for the same crime, are 
subject to the middle tier scrutiny afforded gender classifications. 105 In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 106 the Supreme Court found a classification scheme 
discriminating against unmarried persons to be unconstitutional. More than 
a decade after Eisenstadt was decided, a lower court held that New York >s 
marital rape exemption violated the rights of married women. 107 In this 
landmark case, the court rejected all the traditional policy arguments for 
sustaining the marital rape exemption and found there was no governmental 
interest protected by the marital rape exemption. 108 
Other courts that have considered equal protection challenges to their 
marital rape exemptions have steadfastly held to the argument that only females 
can become pregnant and that the state's primary legitimate interest is the 
pregnancy prevention of young, often unwed women, 109 in order to show that 
gender-based classification was substantially related to the achievement of the 
governmental objective and therefore within constitutional limits. However, 
following this rationale, the courts failed to analyze the definition for the crime 
of rape, and it overlooked the fact that rape is not merely intercourse but a 
crime of violence. Following this line of reasoning, the statute's purpose should 
be to prevent the violent intrusion of a person's body, and thus prevention 
of pregnancy is not a governmental interest substantially related, nor rationally 
related, to the achievement of preventing violence and intrusion. 
In the past, courts were more prepared to uphold gender-based rape 
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statutes upon finding of an important governmental interest that is substantially 
related to the gender-based classification scheme. 110 However, lately, a trend
of holdings that statutes with marital r:ape exemptions violate the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has emerged. 111 Hopefully, 
this step in the right direction on the part of the courts, will be coupled with 
willing and apt responses on the part of the state legislatures. 
A(ii)- The Marital Exemption Violates the Right to Privacy 
Although the constitution does not explicity guarantee a right to privacy, 
the Supreme Court has established the constitutional status this right in such 
cases as Griswold v. Connecticut, 112 Eisenstadt v. Baird, in and Roe v. Wade.
114 In Eisenstadt, the Court refined the contours of personal privacy to mean 
''the right of the individual ... to be free from individual governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child." 115 
The right to privacy has been held to protect bodily integrity, 116 
reproductive freedom, 117 and individual autonomy. 118 The marital rape 
exemption allows a husband to violate his wife's bodily integrity. It allows him 
to impregnate her against her will in denial of her reproductive freedom. And 
perhaps most importantly, the exemption extinguishes a married woman's 
autonomy in one of the most personal and intimate of all human interactions. 
The state thus violates the privacy rights of married women by allowing their 
husbands to rape them without fear of prosecution. 
State laws that interfere with the right to privacy in this way must be 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 119 Some of the state
interests behind marital rape (which have already been examined) include 
respecting marital privacy, encouraging the reconciliation of spouses and 
obviating the evidentiary problem of proving lack of consent in marital rape 
claims but none of these withstands the test of intermediate scrutiny and 
therefore fall short of satisfying a strict standard of judicial review. 120
A second challenge to the marital rape exemption within the ambit of the 
right to privacy is that is unconstitutionally burdens the privacy rights of all 
women. 1�1 Specifically, the marital rape exemption falls within the doctrin of
"unconsitutional conditions" which holds that a state may not condition the 
receipt of government benefits upon the nonassertion of a constitutional right. 
11�The marital rape exemtpion unconsitutionally conditions women's receipt 
of governmental benefits in two distinct ways. First, the exemption conditions 
the benefit of marriage upon women's forfeiture of their rights to bodily 
integrity, procreative freedom, and individual autonomy. 123 Second, the 
exemption works in reverse by conditioning the benefit of protection from rape 
upon women's forfeiture of their fundamental right to marry. 12-+ Thus, the 
exemption forces all women to surrender either their right to marry or their 
right to privacy. Strict scrutiny is applied by the courts in such cases, and since 
as has been indicated, none of the traditional rationales for the marital 
exemption withstand intermediate scrutiny, they \VOuld certainly fail this higher 
le\'el of review. In short, because the state has no compelling governmental 
intere&t in permitting marital rape, only statutes which eliminate the marital 
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rape exemption can withstand constitutional scrutiny based on the right to 
privacy. 125 
B - Limitations of Rights Approach and a Possibly More Successful Alternative
Under Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 
Undeniably, the rights approach as a challenge for the constitutionality
of the marital rape exemption provides a powerful argument. But a strategy 
based on the gender discrimination approach precisely because of its broader 
political perspective might be a wiser medium to ensure the outlawing of the 
marital rape exemption. 
In the sphere of sexuality, the values of security and freedom were and 
still are at loggerheads. In the context of marital rape, a woman's right to marital 
privacy (individual security) confronts a man's right to marital privacy (freedom 
from state intrusion.) The rights approach offers no perspective to help us decide 
whether the man's right to marital privacy is more or less fundamental than 
the woman's right to bodily integrity. Besides, the rights approach seems to 
ignore the only true ground of decision in this context: the reality of women's 
sexual subordination to man. A rights approach individualizes the problem 
of marital rape by defining it in terms of individual rights. The evil of marital 
rape must be corrected because it is the sexual subordination of one group in 
society to another rather than because it is a violation of individual rights. This 
facilitates the creation of bonds among. women who would be thus empowered 
as a group - the way is thus paved for a challenge based on the gender approach. 
In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 126 the Supreme Court announced
a test for evalutating gender-neutral statutes that allegedly discriminate on the 
basis of sex. Feeny asks whether the facially neutral law reflects covert 
discriminatory intent. The answer is in the affirmative if (i) adverse effects and 
(ii) legislative history reveal such intent
The marital rape exemption must therefore be examined under these two
miscroscopes. Women, unarguably suffer adverse effects when they are raped 
by their husbands. The exemption indirectly sanctions sexual violence against 
women and thus perpetrates the myth of the powerless, subordinate female. 
Also, the exemption perpetuates "archaic and overbroad" generalzations 
concering the proper roles of the sexes. 127 In recent cases, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that laws promoting gender stereotypes must be subject to 
heightened scrutiny, because they freeze biology into social destiny. 128 
The primary evidence of discriminatory intent is derived from the historical 
background and legislative history of a law. We must have proof, therefore, 
that the legislative adopted the marital rape exemption at least in part "because 
of' its adverse effects upon women. Although legilative records of the adoption 
of marital rape exemption are not available, judical opinion and treatises from 
the nineteenth century confirm that the marital rape exemption was codified 
from the common law which was in turn based on Hale's doctrine of implied 
consent. This theory, as discussed above, reflects a discriminatory vision of 
women as property and as naturally destined for life in the private sphere. This 
discriminatory purpose clearly constituted the basis for the exemption at the 
time of the adoption and served as the exemption's primary rationale well into 
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the twentieth century. The contemporary justifications for the marital rape 
exemption, although different in form from their nineteenth century 
predecessors, continue to reflect an underlying adherence to an ideology of 
female inferiority. 129
The marital rape exemption has passed both tests - there is proof of adverse 
impact and legislative intent. For these reasons, it must be unconstitutional. 
V. Possible Statutory Reform
Marital rape is definitely out of the closet and there is not even an outside 
chance that it will be shoved back again. Whether changes in rape laws come 
about by court decisions or legislation, advocates agree that marital rape must 
be made a crime in all fifty states. 
Statutes avoiding all archaic policy justifiactions and explicitly providing 
punishment for marital rape are needed throughout the nation. The most 
enlightened approach would settle equal protection problems with a gender­
neutral sexual offense which punishes both men and women for any penetration, 
however slight, and for all other deviant sex crimes. 
New Hampshire has lately revised its sexual assaults and related offenses 
statute. i:io A cursory look at this newly amended statute gives an idea of how 
an enlightened statutory approach should be. The statute is gender neutral 
and specifically disallows the traditional marital rape exemption. Since the 
perpetrator is defined as a ''person'' 1:11 then both male and female victims 
are afforded equal protection under the law. 
The statute also provides for appropriate graduated penalties for varying  
levels of sexual assault. Most importantly, however, the statute explicitly states 
that "(a)n actor commits a crime under this chapter even thought the victim 
is the actor's legal spouse." 132 This specific language leaves no doubt that the 
common law marital rape exemption is no longer part of New Hampshire's 
law; and it will serve to quash arguments that the statute was silent on the 
issue because it was not intended to punish spouses. 
More and more states should subscribe to this approach and reform their 
statutes accordingly. Making sure that the three important elements of ( 1) 
gender neutrality, (2) gradation of penalties, (3) explicit abolition of the marital 
exemption are included therein in clear-cut language. Cohabitors and voluntary 
companions should be included in the definition of "legal spouse". 
Conclusion 
The role of criminal law in our society is to label those behaviours which 
are so reprehensible that a civilized society will not tolerate them. As this paper 
has analyzed, marital rape is very much a reality in our society. It is not only 
the role of social scientists to acknowledge and deal with this reality, but it 
is primarly the duty of the state legislatures and the courts to protect women, 
as a group from such a crime of violence. The evolution of women's status 
from chattel to full-fledged person with all the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship forces the legal system to-rethink many of its platitudes and policies, 
and to help shape attitudes that view rape as a violent act in any context · marital 
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rape is therefore no exception. The time has to come to realize that no legal, 
political or moral justifications exist to allow a man to use force to invade his 
wife's bodily privacy. 
Ironically, the legacy of Hale's flippant and unfounded statement that a 
husband cannot rape his wife 133 continues to ravage· American women - even 
though some progressive states 134 have realized and endorsed its anachronism
and unconstitutionality. Unfortunately, however, even though the case for total 
reform of archaic American rape laws is compelling, most legislatures are 
unwilling to correct the evils fostered by the marital rape exemption. The courts 
in some states have been more responsive, albeit slow, in taking the initiative. 
By focusing upon the harm done to women as a group, and identifying the 
issue as inequality, American legislatures and courts must first acknowledge 
rape for what it is - a crime of violence to which no individual, married or 
single should be subjected - and then proceed to abolish, in no unclear terms, 
the marital rape exemption and provide for prosecution of marital rape. 
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APPENDIX I 
FORM DRAWN UP BY MONTANA LEGISLATION 
Due to a situation in Oregon in which a man is on trial for raping his wife, 
the following '' consent form'' is being furnished as a public service for 
Montana's males. 
It is recommended that no sexual contact be made by Montana's males with 
their wives until this form has been filled out and signed. 
Remember, tonight she· may be willing, but tomorrow YOU MAY BE 
CHARGED WITH RAPE. 
Agreement 
I, --------, do hereby on this ___ day of-------
(Check one) 
_____ Beg 
----- Request 
_____ Agree 
----- Grudingly agree (please pull down 
my nightgown when you're through) 
to ha,·e sexual relations with my husband between the hours of -----
and ____ _ 
(Signed) 
Public Service Form No. 61600. 
Legally, this form is but a one-time agreement, of course. Any sexual contact 
other than on the above date and at the above time shall require a new 
agreement. 
Additional copies of this form can be obtained from State Senator Pat Regan. 
Detach form on dotted lines. 
